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DOES CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY REST UPON 
A FALSE SUPPOSITION? NO. 
LUKE WILLIAM HUNT* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Our understanding of folk and scientific psychology often informs the 
law’s conclusions regarding questions about the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s action. The field of psychology plays a direct role in the law’s 
conclusions about a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and term of 
incarceration. However, physical sciences such as neuroscience 
increasingly deny the intuitions behind psychology. This paper examines 
contemporary biases against the autonomy of psychology and responds 
with considerations that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of those biases. 
The upshot is that if reasonable doubt is established regarding whether 
psychology’s role in the law should be displaced, then there is room for 
future work to be done with respect to the truth of psychology’s 
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On an early May morning in 1987, Kenneth Parks arose from bed and 
drove twenty-three kilometers to the Ontario home of his in-laws with 
whom he was considered close. While they were asleep in bed, Parks 
bludgeoned his mother-in-law with a tire iron, strangled his father-in-law 
until the man passed out, and stabbed them both with a kitchen knife. The 
woman died; the man barely survived. Parks then drove to a police station 
where he confessed but seemed confused about what had transpired. The 
police noticed something odd: Parks appeared oblivious to the fact that he 
had severed tendons in both his hands during the attack. His obliviousness 
to pain, along with other factors such as a family history of parasomnias (a 
category of sleep disorders that includes sleepwalking), led experts to 
testify that Parks was sleepwalking during the attack. Parks was acquitted 
of murder, with the Supreme Court of Canada explaining that: 
“Automatism, although spoken of as a ‘defence,’ is conceptually a sub-set 
of the voluntariness requirement, which in turn is part of the actus reus 
component of criminal liability. An involuntary act, including one 
committed in an automatistic condition entitles an accused to an 
unqualified acquittal . . . .”1 In other words, one who acts as an automaton, 
as it were, cannot be held criminally responsible for one’s acts. 
Although one might be skeptical about the genuineness of some 
defenses involving sleepwalking, the legal conclusion in this case—that 
Parks was not culpable for his mother-in-law’s death and his father-in-
law’s injuries—is roughly consistent with folk psychology. By folk 
psychology, I mean the pre-theoretical, commonsense psychology 
(conceptions of belief, desire, intention, autonomy, free will, and so on) 
that people use to make sense of behavior.2 The folk psychology invoked 
by the court in Parks’s case suggests that one is not morally responsible—
and should not be held criminally liable—for acts one does not commit 
 
 
 1. R. v. Parks, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 871, 872 (Can.). There is a long history of cases that reached 
similar conclusions. See, for example, Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879), in which Mr. Fain 
shot and killed Henry Smith at a hotel in Kentucky. At the murder trial, the court determined that 
Smith had done nothing to incite in Fain a desire to shoot him. The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
overturned Fain’s conviction based upon the fact that Fain suffered from somnambulism 
(sleepwalking), reasoning that if it is possible to commit a homicide while asleep and unconscious—
and if Fain was in such a state—then he should be acquitted because “he was not legally responsible 
for any act done while in that condition.”  Id. at 191.   
 2. See Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe, Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The 
Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions, 41 NOÛS 663 (2007); and Joshua Knobe & Gabriel S. Mendlow, 
The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk 
Psychology, 24 J. OF THEORETICAL AND PHIL. PSYCH. 252 (2004), for an analysis of folk psychology 
and what experimental data says about our intuitions regarding moral responsibility. 











voluntarily. The idea is that Parks should be considered culpable only if he 
caused the death and injuries in a very specific way—a way that did not 
involve acting unconsciously or machine-like. To put it another way, in 
order to have found Parks guilty, the court would have needed to 
determine that Parks willed the voluntary movement of his hands, fingers, 
and arms on the tire iron and knife used in the killing. One might think the 
law’s stance on this point results in further—and more controversial—
implications. For example, is there an unspoken presupposition in the law 
that Parks possessed the capacity to exercise free will? If so, does that 
mean that his mental state would not have been subject to the causal 
influence of his bodily state, particularly his brain state?3   
In many respects, these suppositions underlie our desert-based legal 
institutions given the idea that actions cannot correctly be described as 
voluntary unless one’s will is free.4 As Michael Moore put it: “[D]esert 
[culpable wrongdoing] can exist only if the natural properties on which it 
supervenes (such as voluntariness of action, intentionality, etc.) are not 
illusory.”5 To put the point a bit more starkly, the foundation upon which 
criminal justice rests is perhaps at risk if we fail to get a couple of big, 
metaphysical questions right. These are well-worn questions, and the 
reader may rest assured that this paper will attempt to solve neither the 
problem of free will nor the mind-body problem.6 Instead, this paper 
pursues a more tractable inquiry: namely, the merit in basing criminal 
responsibility on the scientific theories within the field of psychology.7 
 
 
 3. Michael S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the 
Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. AND POL’Y 233, 244 (2012). 
 4. Strictly speaking, there is no “free will requirement” in the criminal law, but rather 
requirements of voluntariness, intention, proximate causation of relevant effects, and other concepts 
that we might describe as running parallel to our folk psychology understanding of behavior. Id. at 
243. 
 5. Id. at 236. In section I.B., Moore discusses the folk psychology presupposed by legal 
institutions and political philosophies.  
6. However, it is worth noting that the assumption that the reducibility of psychology to 
neuroscience entails a threat to free will (and thereby a threat to moral responsibility) is not necessarily 
justified. Although many people make precisely this assumption (including researchers in 
neuroscience), there is of course much debate about its merits in the free will literature. Nor is it 
obvious that one should operate with an implicit libertarian conception of free will and moral 
responsibility (i.e., free action is uncaused action). That said, I will not focus on these and related 
questions in this paper. 
7. Unless otherwise noted, I use the term psychology generally without specifying its many 
subfields, though cognitive, experimental, and clinical psychology are most relevant to the thesis of 
this paper. And, to be clear, I am distinguishing the science of psychology from folk psychology. 
Although I assume that the former corresponds in many ways to the commonsense positions of the 
latter, I will suggest that the science of psychology also has its own modes of inquiry and domain of 
study. As I will discuss, it might be true that the science of psychology has a somewhat vague domain 













In one sense, in the context of law, psychology addresses the big 
questions to which I have alluded on a case-by-case basis. For example, 
our understanding of psychology often informs legal conclusions with 
respect to questions regarding the voluntariness of a particular defendant’s 
action or the extent to which an action may have resulted from a 
psychiatric disorder. Indeed, the field of psychology often plays a direct 
role in the law’s conclusion regarding a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and 
term of incarceration. On the other hand, physical sciences such as 
neuroscience8 increasingly deny both the intuitions behind our folk 
psychology and the scientific conclusions of psychology proper.9 To be 
sure, there are profound differences between folk psychology and 
psychology as a science, not least of which is that folk psychology is a 
commonsensical theory (one we use to interpret human behavior) while 
experimental and clinical psychology is a part of science proper. Still, folk 
and scientific psychology are tied together in important ways: Generally 
speaking, the core concepts of Western law are based on folk psychology, 
and professional psychologists provide evidence of those concepts as 
expert witnesses in the legal context.10 In a sense, then, scientific 
psychology bolsters folk psychology by providing more nuanced 
categories and concepts that are based upon scientific evidence (even if 
not physical science)—such as measuring variables including movements 
and times (all of which are embedded in the physical world) in order to 
draw conclusions on mental phenomena.  
With this in mind, this paper examines the extent to which critiques of 
folk and scientific psychology are justified by inquiring whether the 
physical sciences—particularly, neuroscience—have ontological authority 
over the mental sciences—or psychology—such that psychology should 
be thought of as a “higher-level” domain that is reducible to some aspect 
of neuroscience.11 More specifically, this paper argues that if psychology 
 
 
8.  Strictly speaking, one might describe neuroscience not as a “physical science,” but rather 
as a “special science.” In other words, while neuroscience might be thought of as fundamentally 
physical, it is different than, say, physics. See, e.g., Jerry Fodor, Special Sciences and the Disunity of  
Science as a Working Hypothesis, 28 SYNTHESE 97 (1974). I use the term physical science more 
generally, with the idea being to highlight its distinction from psychology.  
9.  Although there are no doubt exceptions, Moore rightly suggests that neuroscientists 
typically deny Cartesian dualism, free will, and many other folk psychology assumptions about 
behavior. Moore, supra note 2, at 244.  
10. See FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT: A CASEBOOK (Kirk Heilbrun, David 
DeMatteo, Stephanie Brooks Holliday & Casey LaDuke eds., 2014) (discussing principles used by 
mental health professionals to provide evaluations that facilitate better-informed legal decision-
making).  
11. A theory’s predictive power—which will be addressed in Part I— is perhaps the most 
important factor in determining whether it is justified in the domain of the law. However, even though 
the issue of ontology might not seem directly relevant in the law, this paper contends that a more 











and the physical sciences are fundamentally different modes of inquiry, 
then it is a mistake to suggest that the former may be reduced to the 
latter.12 I will conclude by examining a framework for how one might 
deem psychology true, settling upon a version of scientific realism 
(roughly, “the view that scientific theories correctly describe the nature of 
a mind-independent world”13) that may be reconciled with empiricism 
(roughly, the view that all knowledge and belief are based upon evidence 
from experience14) in terms of detectability.15 The consequent is that such 
a framework will allow us to describe more clearly the role that 
psychology plays in our understanding of criminal responsibility and the 
extent to which that role is justified. 
A brief note about what this paper does not argue: It does not argue that 
neuroscience and psychology are mutually exclusive or that they are 
monolithic fields moving in wholly separate directions. For example, it is 
of course standard for social and cognitive psychologists to utilize 
neuroimaging evidence in their work, and it is likewise standard for 
neuroscientists to formulate hypotheses on the basis of theories from 
cognitive and social psychology. Moreover, it is not the case that 
neuroscience is committed to the denial of all folk level concepts, nor is it 
the case that psychology embraces all such concepts.16 So it is no doubt 
true that both neuroscience and psychology may invoke similar 
representational and motivational states with respect to, say, explaining 
how beliefs and desires work. Indeed, most neuroscientists and 
psychologists agree—and much of the literature on criminal responsibility 
does not deny—that one’s mental states are subject to the causal influence 
 
 
clearly developed picture of a theory’s underlying ontological commitments might put that theory on a 
firmer footing.   
12. Roughly, I mean that while the physical sciences and psychology perhaps overlap in their 
modes of inquiry and domain of study occasionally, each involves fundamentally different ways of 
examining fundamentally different phenomena. I will try to make this point more clearly in Part I. 
Incidentally, to the extent this is a category mistake, its original use has perhaps been turned on its 
head. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949). 
13. See ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY, A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM 4 (2010). 
14. See Peter Markie, Rationalism vs. Empiricism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 6, 
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/#Empi [https://perma.cc/3ZMJ-
FWVN]. 
15. By detectability, I mean something similar to Dudley Shapere’s notion of observation, 
which generally includes the position that observational evidence may be based upon information that 
is not directly accessible to the senses, but rather received by receptors that are more dependable than 
sense-perception. Dudley Shapere, The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy, 49 PHIL. 
SCI. 485, 508–11 (1982). Shapere does not explicitly equate detection with observation but considers 
this position. 
16. For instance, although the work of many neuroscientists seems to suggest that there is no 
true free will, many psychologists have of course reached similar conclusions. See, for example, the 












of one’s brain states.17 Nevertheless, there is a real and practical problem 
that deserves attention. Stephen Morse has called it “Brain Overclaim 
Syndrome”: an unjustified approach to “think[ing] about the relation of 
neuroscience (or any other material explanation of human behavior) to 
criminal responsibility…that cannot be conceptually or empirically 
sustained.”18 This paper seeks to examine the problem from a new 
perspective.19 
I. ONTOLOGICAL AUTHORITY, REDUCTION, AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Actus reus—or guilty act—is one of most fundamental elements of a 
crime. Although Parks’s case involved a homicide, Parks’ “act” is not a 
properly-construed legal act because there was no voluntary muscular 
contraction when he squeezed his fingers around the tire iron and knife. 
Thus, the voluntariness of the act is of central importance. As the court 
suggested in R. v. Parks, one who acts as an automaton cannot be held 
criminally responsible for one’s acts.20 In easier cases, one might think that 
folk psychology is sufficient to explain what it means to act voluntarily. In 
more difficult cases—those involving sleepwalking and mental 
abnormalities, for example—we often rely upon the scientific field of 
psychology to understand whether an act is voluntary. It is proper to ask 
whether this reliance is justified. This question is even more important if it 
is true that psychology should be ultimately subsumed by a more 
 
 
17. More specifically, most would agree that mental states are brain states, not merely that 
the former are subject to the causal influence of the latter. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain 
Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 398 
(2006), declaring “I am a thorough-going, matter-up materialist who believes that all mental and 
behavioral activity is the causal product of lawful physical events in the brain.” 
18. Id. at 397. Somewhat related, it should be noted that regardless of whether one thinks that 
psychology might be reducible to neuroscience in its current form or whether one thinks that 
psychology might be reducible to neuroscience in principle (i.e., some future, more perfected version 
of neuroscience), there are of course many challenges with contemporary neuroscience that are similar 
to those faced by contemporary psychology (e.g., problems with replicability, faulty statistical 
methods, and so on). Even under the latter view of neuroscience (an in-principle perfected version), 
neuroscience would at a minimum still need psychology to tell it what it is studying, so to speak. For 
example, suppose a neuroscientist claims to have identified the neural regions underlying the 
experience of disgust. The neuroscience would presumably make the case for this by showing that 
particular patterns of neural activation correlate with particular behavioral patterns that we associate 
with the feeling of disgust. These dependent variables (feelings, behavior, particular judgments) are 
posits of folk and scientific psychology. 
19. For other recent approaches to this and related problems, see Eric Hochstein, Giving Up 
on Convergence and Autonomy: Why the Theories of Psychology and Neuroscience Are Codependent 
as Well as Irreconcilable, 56 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 135 (2016). 
20. See Richard B. Brandt, The Principles of Criminal Law, in THE NATURE AND PROCESS 
OF LAW (Patricia Smith ed., 1993), for a general overview of the elements of a crime, including the 
requirement that an act is voluntary. 











fundamental physical science that will transform our views about criminal 
responsibility.21 
A. Physical Science and Ontological Authority22  
The notion of reduction has prima facie appeal to the scientific-minded 
inasmuch as the basic idea is to reduce scientific domains to their most 
fundamental “levels.” But before one can address the notion of reduction 
directly, one must come to grips with certain biases regarding the 
presumed ontological supremacy of the physical sciences. In other words, 
even if one should assume the notion of reduction is justified within 
scientific domains, one must first examine the assumption that psychology 
is the science that ought to be reduced. To be sure, no one seriously denies 
the importance of, say, physics or that the world is perhaps largely 
physical, but is the jump to granting ontological authority to the physical 
sciences justified in every case?23 The answer to this question will frame 
the argument regarding the extent to which psychology is justified in 
forming a basis for the law’s conception of criminal responsibility. 
There are two well  known problems with drawing a sharp line between 
physical science and psychology.24 First, let us assume that there are no 
clear cases of psychophysical laws (law connecting mental and physical 
states).25 Assuming arguendo, it does not follow that psychology is 
completely unlike physical science with regard to laws. Indeed, nothing 
 
 
21. See, e.g., Robert Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 1787 (2004); Josh Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the 
Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 
LONDON 1775 (2004). 
22. I will not take up the related issue of physicalism, the thesis that the world is limited to 
the physical, because it introduces more issues than can be dealt with in the context of this paper. For 
example, physicalism itself may be reductive or non-reductive, and the reduction in question is not 
limited to scientific domains. One prominent variation is Jaegwon Kim’s causal closure naturalism, 
which is “the thesis that the natural world, that is the space-time-causal world, is causally closed.”  
Jaegwon Kim, From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux, 85 PROC. AM. PHIL. ASS’N 
109, 113 (2011). Kim suggests that we make the move from naturalism to (non-reductive) physicalism 
because the “world is a fundamentally physical one, and that physics is the science that promises us 
the most comprehensive coverage of the world at its deepest levels.” Id. at 118. Kim supports this 
assertion with the premise that physical effects do not have nonphysical causes, i.e., the physical world 
is causally closed. Id. This premise lays the foundation for Kim’s mind-body supervenience, the thesis 
that every property in the world is physical or supervenes on physical properties. Although these are 
important issues, I will not take up the details of Kim’s argument because I do not think they have a 
direct bearing on my discussion of physical science and ontological authority.  
23. Tim Crane & D.H. Mellor, There Is No Question of Physicalism, 99 MIND 185 (1990). 
24. These two objections are from Crane and Mellor.  
25. As I will discuss in Part II, there is reason not to grant these assumptions, e.g., based 
upon psychological laws regarding perception and psychophysics, which might help show how 












precludes psychology from defining its own mental ontology in the same 
way that physical science defines its ontology. This point foreshadows the 
close relationship between the presumed ontological authority of physical 
sciences and reduction. As Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor rightly suggested 
almost three decades ago with respect to chemistry, in the same way that 
“chemistry’s ontological authority does not depend on its being reducible 
to physics via physicochemical laws,” by analogy psychology does not 
depend upon the existence of strict psychophysical laws.26 Second, let us 
assume that the totality of all true physical theories—in physics perhaps—
is close to comprehensive. But, again, even if we grant this point, it does 
not preclude psychological laws. Rather, it would only be necessary that 
psychological laws be consistent with the true laws of physical science; 
truth must of course be consistent with truth, but this platitude grants no 
ontological authority to the physical sciences.27 In the end, the larger point 
is that if the above-noted problems are legitimate, then at a minimum it 
seems reasonable to embrace agnosticism with respect to psychological 
laws, stopping short of granting ontological authority to the physical 
sciences. The point seems right absent a more clearly established 
demarcation that grants the ontological authority of the physical sciences 
over psychology. 
The most common objection to this conclusion is perhaps based upon 
the principle of parsimony.28 If neuroscience explains approximately the 
same entities as psychology, then Occams’s razor would suggest that we 
ought to reduce psychology based upon psychology’s surplusage. 
However, it would seem that in this case both psychology and 
neuroscience are needed to explain the relevant entities and phenomena 
that are of principal concern in each field respectively. As discussed 
below, psychology and the physical sciences surely overlap in many cases, 
but if psychology is a fundamentally different mode of inquiry than 
neuroscience, then reducing psychological entities and phenomena is 
untenable. 
B. Psychology and Reduction 
Reduction is at times discussed loosely, and I want to begin by spelling 
out what is meant by reductionism. According to Ernest Nagel’s well 
known theoretical framework: Reduction is a deductive procedure that 
 
 
26. Crane & Mellor, supra note 23, at 198. 
27. Id. at 202. 
28. See HUGH G. GAUCH, JR., SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PRACTICE (2003) for a pragmatic 
defense of parsimony. 











provides an explanation of the “higher level” theoretical claim upon the 
reducing level premises and a conclusion from such premises: 
Homogeneous reduction is an explanation in which the relevant 
descriptive and subject-matter terms in the conclusion are included in the 
premises—a deductive explanation.29 Inhomogeneous reduction is an 
explanation in which at least one descriptive term in the conclusion neither 
occurs in the premises nor is definable by those that do.30 In cases of 
inhomogeneous reduction, a “higher-level” theory may be reduced to a 
“lower-level” theory by using “bridge laws” that explain the relations of 
dependence between the two theories.31 
With this rough and ready idea of what reductionism is, one can 
highlight what is at stake. There are different ways to consider 
reductionism’s role in threatening the ordinary notion of criminal 
responsibility. Reductionism might seem to mean that we are in a state of 
perpetual somnambulism, so to speak. Like the sleepwalking Mr. Parks, 
reductionism might mean that we are nothing more than an automaton. 
But unlike cases of sleepwalking, reductionism might further mean that 
our lack of responsibility is permanent. Reduction might thus result in the 
view that it is absurd to ever hold one criminally responsibility for one’s 
acts because, as Moore puts it, “the reduction of minds to brains, and of 
actions to physical movements, is taken by some to eliminate the self (or 
the “I”) of conscious experience and agency.”32 Thus, under at least one 
interpretation of reductionism, even the cases in which we deem it 
appropriate to hold a defendant criminally liable, doing so is actually akin 
to holding a defendant criminally responsible for his acts committed while 
sleepwalking.33     
Still, before reductionism can even get off the ground, one’s 
assumptions must be acknowledged and the extent to which those 
assumptions are justified. There is an unstated—and I argue unfounded—
assumption that the so-called higher level theory is inferior to the so-called 
lower level theory. The defense of this assumption is critical because the 
 
 
29. Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations, in EMERGENCE (Mark 
Bedau & Paul Humphreys eds., 2008). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Moore, supra note 3, at 258. 
33. Alternatively, one might argue that reduction threatens our understanding of criminal 
responsibility negatively via eliminative materialism. This sort of threat is actually non-reductive. The 
idea is that notions such as moral blameworthiness are illusions because “we cannot reduce intentions 
to brain states, minds to brains . . . . It is because mental states (given their Intentionality) cannot be 
reduced to brain states that they can have no place in (what will turn out to be) the best explanation of 
human behavior, an explanation, in terms of brain states.”  Id. at 259. This issue strays too far from my 












assumption justifies the reductionary move. Psychology is a paradigmatic 
example because there exists a prevalent assumption that psychology will 
be reduced absolutely to, for example, neuroscience. But in the same vein 
as the discussion above, one might reasonably ask from where the ranking 
of levels is derived; how does one level achieve authority over another? It 
is by no means clear that one may infer which theory is “higher” and 
which theory is “lower” from the mere fact that one theory may be derived 
from another theory. There may be cases in which this sort of hierarchical 
framework seems ostensibly appropriate, but this may be less about a 
reducible hierarchical framework and more about the fact that some 
theories provide more empirical adequacy, predictive power, success, 
simplicity, and so on, depending upon the phenomena under consideration 
and the mode of inquiry employed.34 Thus, one must be careful to 
distinguish questions regarding the extent to which something is a 
“higher” level and reducible, from questions regarding the extent to which 
a theory has more predictive power. Otherwise, one might be guilty of 
comparing neuroscience’s apples to psychology’s oranges. Although the 
apples are undeniably more filling in many cases, the oranges are, to be 
sure, more fruitful in others. If psychology and neuroscience in some cases 
examine fundamentally different phenomena using fundamentally 
different modes of inquiry, then the suggestion that the former is a higher-
level theory that may be reduced to the latter’s more basic theory is based 
upon an inappropriate paradigm. And while they are important 
considerations, predictive power and success ought to be viewed as 
separate issues.  
This could perhaps be illustrated more clearly with an example. The 
(much maligned) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fifth Edition (DSM-5) is used in the fields of psychology and psychiatry 
to classify mental disorders in the United States by cataloguing symptoms 
and behavioral characteristics.35 As a diagnostic manual, its aim is not to 
carve nature at its joints. Nevertheless, it is illustrative here: A person may 
be diagnosed with a personality disorder (say, “Borderline Personality 
Disorder” (BPD)) based upon whether the person exhibits certain features, 
including certain traits and mental states (e.g., impulsivity, instability of 
 
 
34. One can certainly order scientific disciplines in a top-bottom ranking on the basis of their 
object of study: the bigger and more complex the object, the higher the level. A dog is bigger than a 
cell, which is bigger than an enzyme, which is in turn bigger than an electron. Accordingly, zoology is 
in a “higher” position than cell biology, which is over biochemistry, which is in turn less fundamental 
than particle physics. This straightforward ordering is not the sort of ordering with which this paper 
takes issue.  
35. See JASON SCHNITTKER, THE DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM: WHY THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IS NECESSARY, DIFFICULT, AND NEVER SETTLED (2017). 











affect, unstable interpersonal relationships and self-image) gleaned from 
various methods of evaluation. The origin and nature of the relevant traits 
are not delineated precisely; indeed, theories regarding the cause of BPD 
are based upon a host of factors, including social environments, 
temperament, neurochemical abnormalities, and genetics.36 The point is 
that a complete picture of the relevant diagnostic criteria is hardly 
delineated in full.37 As such, it is perhaps difficult to argue that psychology 
describes truly and completely the nature of the mind-independent world 
with respect to particular psychological diagnoses. The underlying 
phenomena may very well be mind-independent, but we might be 
skeptical about the extent to which, say, the DSM-5 accounts for this truly. 
But does it follow that we should think of psychology and neuroscience 
as higher and lower-level theories, respectively—such that psychology 
should ultimately be subsumed by neuroscience? To be sure, the above 
example suggests that we may very well find it difficult to be realists with 
respect to all aspects of psychology—certainly not in the precise manner 
that a diagnosis might imply. However, the example also shows how 
certain areas of psychology might be autonomous while still having a 
neural basis in some sense. Although the hierarchy of physical sciences 
tends to be based upon ontological inclusion relations (e.g., atoms are 
included in molecules, molecules are constituents of DNA, DNA is a 
component of biological organisms), these ontological inclusion relations 
do not hold between psychology and the physical sciences despite 
psychology having some sort of neural basis. And, despite a neural basis, 
psychology might still be considered autonomous from neuroscience 
because neuroscience fails to answer some of the questions of 
psychology.38 To the extent that something such as BPD is a multifaceted 
phenomenon regarding the way a personality is, there exists any number 
of psychological questions regarding one’s state of mind, conscious 
experience, and so on, which cannot be reduced along ontological 
inclusion relations coherently.  
 
 
36. See BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (Barbara Stanley & Antonia New eds., 2017), 
for a comprehensive overview of all aspects of BPD.  
37. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th 
ed. 2013). To be sure, the DSM is widely criticized because (arguably) little of it is based upon actual 
science and it is mostly a tool that is used by health insurance companies to issue reimbursements. 
38. Of course, neuroscience can answer the questions of psychology in some cases. For 
example, damage to some visual pathways can cause distortions in vision, and one might explain 
psychological phenomena relating to those distortions in terms of neurological phenomena. The point 













Neither reduction nor subordinating psychology seem appropriate in 
this case because it is difficult to be a realist with respect to all the parts of 
the multifaceted phenomenon. If the physical sciences have not been 
delineated infallibly and with finality, then one should not expect such 
success from psychology either.39 The fact that sophisticated theories 
regarding mental states have not been delineated in exceptionless rules 
seems to differ little from the failure to do so in quantum mechanics, for 
example.40 Now it may be reasonably argued that such a comparison is far 
from apt. After all, it is probably right to say that no other set of theories in 
the history of science has been as accurate as physics,41 and perhaps we 
are relatively close to delineating physics infallibly and with finality. 
However, if even the epitome of scientific theories leaves room for 
improvement, then the general point still seems to hold: Because 
psychology is incomplete, it should not be reduced to a physical science. 
To suggest that the multifaceted mental states, conditions, and 
abnormalities—with which psychology is uniquely concerned—can and 
should be reduced to some more fundamental level seems both unrealistic 
and to miss the point of psychology. Psychology and the physical sciences 
surely complement each other in many cases. But if the former is a 
fundamentally different mode of inquiry than the latter, then a reductionist 
framework is perhaps untenable. 
If it is right to say, as argued, that neuroscience lacks ontological 
authority over psychology and that psychology should not be considered a 
“higher-level” domain reducible to neuroscience, the reductive thesis 
regarding the ontological authority of the physical sciences does not 
undermine psychology’s role with respect to informing the law’s 
conception of criminal responsibility. To put the point another way, there 
is at a minimum reasonable doubt whether the reductive thesis regarding 
the ontological authority of the physical sciences demonstrates that 
psychology’s role in the law is unjustified. Nonetheless an important 
question remains: to what extent might one be a scientific realist about the 
claims that psychology makes in the legal domain?   
 
 
39. Crane & Mellor, supra note 23, at 197. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, QED: THE STRANGE THEORY OF LIGHT AND MATTER 5 
(2014) (“The theory of quantum mechanics also explained all kinds of details, such as why an oxygen 
atom combines with two hydrogen atoms to make water, and so on. Quantum mechanics thus supplied 
the theory behind chemistry.”). 











II. SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND EMPIRICISM IN THE LAW 
Even if there are problems with the reductive thesis regarding the 
ontological authority of the physical sciences, it does not follow that the 
conclusions of psychology with respect to criminal responsibility are true. 
We perhaps need a framework for examining the truth of psychology’s 
conclusions, including those that might form the basis of the law’s core 
principles—such as actus reus. In this part, I provide a sketch for such a 
framework. This suggested framework settles upon a version of scientific 
realism that may be reconciled with empiricism vis-à-vis detectability. The 
conclusion suggests that if psychology consists of empirical laws, then 
scientific realism is a coherent position with respect to those aspects of 
psychology relating to laws.    
There has by now developed a variant of scientific realism for almost 
any taste. The broadening notion of what counts as scientific realism 
enhances the demarcation of philosophical positions, particularly as they 
relate to specific metaphysical commitments. Put another way, scientific 
realism may be thought of in terms of a spectrum that permits incremental 
movements toward metaphysics on one terminus of the spectrum and 
empiricism on the other terminus. However, given the wide range of 
positions that fall under the umbrella of scientific realism, it is not always 
clear what is at stake when a position is labeled “realist.” One might ask, 
for instance, whether realism is necessarily opposed to empiricism and 
whether realists are necessarily committed to metaphysics. I suggest that 
these questions should be answered in the negative. This is particularly 
true when one considers the diversity of positions that might be called 
empirical. The epistemic component of empiricism is that all knowledge 
and belief is based upon evidence from experience. The empiricist 
traditionally interpreted experience as sense-perception.42 It is only 
through this interpretation—an interpretation that treats empiricism as an 
enterprise that conflates experiential evidence with sense-perception—that 
empiricism fails as a basis for scientific epistemology. But, as this paper 
suggests, one need not interpret empiricism so anachronistically. 
A. Realism, Empiricism, and Detectability  
As noted, scientific realism may be defined roughly as the view that 
scientific theories describe the nature of a mind-independent world.43  This 
seemingly innocuous approximation has been targeted on at least three key 
 
 
42. See Shapere, supra note 15, at 508. 












fronts, which include problems regarding: (1) the legitimacy of the 
inference to the best explanation (IBE); (2) the underdetermination of 
theory choice by data (UTD); and (3) the pessimistic induction (PI).44 In 
responding to these problems, many scientific realists have shifted—on a 
number of levels—to a more tempered account of realism. It is this general 
shift that has dissolved any semblance of a strict realism-empiricism 
dichotomy. It is this shift that paves the way for one to take a realist stance 
with respect to psychology’s claims about the law. Here are two examples. 
First, consider the PI charge that most historical scientific theories are 
considered false by present day scientific standards; therefore, by 
induction, our present-day theories (such as those within the field of 
psychology) will likely be recognized as false at some future time. The 
realist often responds to this problem by softening her epistemic 
convictions. She might claim, for instance, that one need not believe that 
scientific theories are true per se or true simpliciter, but rather 
“approximately true” only.45 To be sure, this is a reasonable stance 
considering the sophistication of current scientific theories. Less certain, 
however, is whether the realist can overcome the inherent vagueness in a 
notion such as “approximate truth.”46 The more relevant point here is that 
the realist’s move away from a hard and fast notion of true theories shifts 
the realist closer to contemporary variants of empiricism. This is because 
contemporary variants of empiricism may very well be reconciled with the 
notion of approximate truth, at least to the extent that approximate truth 
means something less than truth. Second—and related to the first shift—
many realists now embrace the position that realism applies only to 
theories that are “genuinely successful” or “mature.”47 This shift is a 
further narrowing of the sorts of theories that count as true descriptions of 
a mind-independent world—an incremental step from theories that might 
 
 
44. See id. at 5–8, for a description of these problems. I will focus on PI. The other problems 
may be summarized as follows: IBE, often referred to as abduction, is the position that one ought to 
“infer the hypothesis that, if true, would provide the best explanation for whatever it is you hope to 
explain.” For example, an IBE answer to the question of why scientific theories are so successful 
might be that the scientific theories are true. Roughly, UTD is the thesis that there are multiple ways to 
account for scientific evidence (data from observation, experimentation, and so on) and that it is not 
always clear which theory is true with respect to the data. See id. 
45. Id. at 7–8. 
46. The extent to which there exists a satisfactory account of approximate truth is unclear. 
The literature on the topic is expansive and falls more generally under the terms verisimilitude and 
truthlikeness, though each may be distinguished. See, e.g., Thomas Weston, Approximate Truth and 
Scientific Realism, 59 PHIL. SCI. 53 (1992); Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo, Progress as 
Approximation to Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach, 78 ERKENNTNIS 921 (2013); 
Graham Oddie, Truthlikeness, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 9, 2007), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truthlikeness/ [https://perma.cc/LLV7-R85G]. 
47. CHAKRAVARTTY, supra note 13, at 7–8. 











be considered more speculative and an incremental step toward 
empiricism generally. 
These shifts culminate in variants of realism that closely resemble 
variants of empiricism. More specifically, one might argue that the 
realist’s notion of genuinely successful can be taken to mean empirically 
successful.48 For example, the realist and the empiricist might both agree 
that some notion of experience is the source of our knowledge of the 
natural world; moreover, that notion of experience may very well be 
linked to a notion of detectability. Consider Anjan Chakravartty’s 
“semirealism,” which is roughly the position that “concrete structures are 
relations between first-order properties of things.”49 One of the central 
goals of Chakravartty’s project is to respond to PI by building upon the 
foundation laid by entity realism (ER) and structural realism (SR).50 The 
basic idea is that semirealism embraces ER’s focus on our causal 
interactions with the world in order to shed light on the structure of the 
world.51 Crucial to this goal is the notion of detectability, and it is this 
notion that pushes Chakravartty’s semirealism closer to variants of 
empiricism. Semirealism embraces the notion that realists may commit to 
the ontological status of a particular with respect to relations of detection 
properties (causal properties one has detected), while remaining 
noncommittal with respect to auxiliary properties (any other properties 
associated with a particular theory).52   
Now, no one would argue that this resembles anything close to 
traditional empiricism, nor is it clear that contemporary commentators 
have argued explicitly that detectable equals observable, but this is the 
position I want to stake out. Although the literature may not endorse this 
position explicitly, others have suggested that empiricism ought to be 
conceived of in a comparable way. Two examples worth noting include 
Dudley Shapere’s attempt to reconcile the fundamental tenets of 
empiricism with sophisticated scientific methods that allow us to 
 
 
48. For a general discussion of this point, see section 1.3 of Anjan Chakravartty, Scientific 
Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (April 27, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/scientific-realism/ [https://perma.cc/4543-SWGA]. 
49. CHAKRAVARTTY, supra note 13, at 41. 
50. ER is the position “that under certain conditions, one has good reason to believe that the 
entities described by scientific theories exist in a mind-independent reality,” including because of our 
causal contact with the entities in question. Id. at 30. SR is the position that “insofar as . . . scientific 
theories offer approximately true descriptions of a mind-independent reality, they do not tell us about 
its nature, or more specifically, the nature of its unobservable parts. Rather, they tell us about its 
structure.”  Id. at 33. 
51. Id. at 56. 
52. Id. at 47–48. Chakravartty subsequently argues that his position allows the realist to 
“identify concrete structures having this epistemic warrant, and to explain why precisely these 












“observe” via detection,53 and Jim Bogen’s suggestion that “an 
epistemically prudent empiricism . . . would allow commitment to claims 
about unobservable phenomena (including causal factors and processes 
and not just regularities) that can be legitimately inferred from perceptual 
and instrument generated data.”54 This sort of empiricism and the sort of 
scientific realism expressed in semirealism blur the lines between what 
counts as empiricism and what counts as realism. They also help show that 
scientific realism may require very little in terms of metaphysical 
commitments, perhaps allowing one to be a realist with respect to certain 
aspects of psychology. The below discussion examines how those 
commitments might be centered upon detectability. 
B. Realism and Metaphysical Commitments 
In Part I.B, using the DSM-5 diagnosis of BPD as an example, it was 
suggested how it is perhaps untenable to argue that psychology describes 
truly and completely the nature of the mind-independent world with 
respect to such psychological diagnoses. One might very well find it 
difficult to be a realist with respect to all aspects of psychology, 
particularly in the manner the DSM-5 might imply. However, this is 
simply because psychology—like other sciences—has not established 
holistic theories regarding mental states that have been delineated in 
empirical laws. But this does not mean that no empirical laws exist that we 
may deem true, as was assumed. Below is a sketch of how one might take 
a realist position with respect to some parts of psychology, but not others.  
First assume that one of the goals of the sciences, including 
psychology, is to describe some aspect of the world. It has already been 
argued that we ought to dispense with any hierarchical notion of the 
sciences that subordinates psychology, and now it will be argued that we 
ought to dispense with this notion specifically with respect to the view that 
psychology lacks scientific laws.55 From the outset, one should note that 
the notion of a scientific law may be interpreted in a rather wide variety of 
ways. Laws are often tied to empiricist traditions (hence the name, 
empirical laws), which describe laws as generalizations that are universal 
and true. If there are such laws in psychology, then one might be a realist 
 
 
53. See Shapere, supra note 15, for a brief discussion of this issue and Shapere’s position. 
54. Jim Bogen, ‘Saving the Phenomena’ and Saving the Phenomena, 182 SYNTHESE 7, 20 
(2011). 
55. There is perhaps no consensus regarding what constitutes a law. For an overview of the 
various positions on this issue, see John W. Carroll, Laws of Nature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(December 26, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/laws-of-nature/ 
[https://perma.cc/U3FQ-Z5V8]. 











about these fundamental aspects of psychology that are supported by 
methods of detection based upon experimentation and the resulting data. 
Consider the many laws involving perception or psychophysics, for 
instance, such as Stevens’s Power Law, which states that equal physical 
stimulus ratios produce equal subjectively perceived intensity ratios.56 
Although it may not be clear how (if at all) such laws apply to all the 
specific applications of psychology (in the diagnosis of all cases of mental 
abnormalities, for instance), psychology might be defined generally by this 
and other psychophysical laws. One might thus be an anti-realist about one 
particular aspect of psychology (e.g., about some particular mental state or 
abnormality), yet continue to remain a realist about the phenomena 
underlying laws that are fundamental to psychology and that are perhaps 
detectable via experimentation. Although this might be a less stringent 
notion of what a law is in some respects, it can reasonably be argued that 
the underlying phenomena is detectible—and this perhaps goes a long way 
in terms of eroding away the strict distinction between realism and 
empiricism to which the paper has alluded. Detectability, then, draws 
together variants of scientific realism and variants of empiricism, and it is 
this drawing together that simultaneously dissolves many of the potential 
metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. The larger point about 
the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism is this: realism comes 
in degrees of selectivity, and the realist may commit to the mind-
independent reality of one thing, while stopping short in her belief about a 
great many other things. The realist—like the empiricist—may begin by 
basing their beliefs on sense-perception, move to things that may be 
observed via detection only, and then embrace agnosticism well before 
they reach the more abstract realm of forms, universals, and other areas of 
metaphysics in which there is less room for agreement. Based upon the 
similarities between contemporary scientific realism and empiricism, this 
hardly seems surprising. In a similar way, it is equally unsurprising how 
one might be a realist with respect to certain core aspects of psychology 
that we consider detectable. 
CONCLUSION 
What are we to make of the case of Mr. Parks, particularly the 
suppositions on which the law bases his lack of criminal responsibility? If 
psychology informs the law’s conclusion with respect to issues such as the 
lack of voluntariness (or the presence of voluntariness in other cases), and 
 
 












physical sciences such as neuroscience deny the scientific conclusions of 
psychology, then to what extent is the law’s notion of criminal 
responsibility justified? This paper provided a generalized answer to these 
sorts of questions by examining whether physical sciences such as 
neuroscience have ontological authority over mental sciences such as 
psychology such that psychology should be subsumed by neuroscience. 
The paper has attempted to show that if psychology and the physical 
sciences are fundamentally different modes of inquiry, then it is a mistake 
to suggest that the former may be reduced to the latter. But this is only half 
of the story.  
A framework for addressing the extent to which psychology might be 
deemed true is still needed. The paper has taken an initial step toward this 
end by proposing a version of scientific realism that may be reconciled 
with empiricism in terms of detectability. Specifically, it was argued that if 
psychology includes empirical laws that are supported by methods of 
detection based upon experimentation and the resulting data, then one 
might sensibly be a realist with respect to those aspects of psychology. 
Unfortunately, this is not an easy business, and these matters have 
certainly not been resolved with finality. More work must be done to shore 
up the loose ends, particularly with respect to the different modes of 
inquiry within psychology and the establishment of an appropriate 
mechanism for selecting which aspects of psychology are to be interpreted 
realistically.57 But the contention is that there is at least reasonable doubt 
about whether psychology’s role in the law should be displaced based 
upon the reductive thesis regarding the ontological authority of the 
physical sciences. This doubt helps clear the way for adopting a version of 




57. One approach that seems promising—and that seems generally consistent with the 
groundwork I have tried to lay—is Daniel A. Weiskopf’s view that cognitive models of psychological 
capacities, despite being non-mechanistic, meet the normative standards for explanation and should 
not be reduced to mechanistic approaches. Daniel A. Weiskopf, Models and Mechanisms in 
Psychological Explanation, 183 SYNTHESE 313, 314–15 (2011). The basic idea behind Weiskopf’s 
approach is that “a system’s behavior can be explained from many distinct epistemic perspectives, 
each of which is illuminating. Viewed from one perspective, the brain might be a hierarchical 
collection of neural mechanisms; viewed from another, it might instantiate a set of cognitive models 
that classify the system in ways that cut across mechanistic boundaries.”  Id. at 334. 
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